This article explores the limitations of business case SRI and considers how the legal system can restore an ethical basis to ethical investment for furthering environmental sustainability. Among possible reforms, it is argued that redefining the fiduciary duties of investment institutions is most crucial. Certainly, there will always be some room for individuals to choose lawful investments according to their own moral scruples. Yet, as financial institutions invest on behalf of millions and wield enormous economic influence, they must be seen as endowed with public responsibilities and be governed by standards that protect natural systems for the long term. Fiduciary duties, which govern how financial decision-makers should manage the assets of investors, presently are framed in a way that may accommodate business case SRI. But they hardly license ethical investment.
SRI's morph to the business case
The SRI movement is seeking greater accountability of the financial sector for the environmental problems connected to the economic activities it funds (Jeucken, 2001; Labatt and White, 2002) . Investors have traditionally been remote to the environmental sequelae of their financing decisions (Thomas, 2001) . Causal relationships between finance and its environmental impacts are dispersed widely across time and space, often obscuring investors' responsibility for the degradation. In a sense, financial institutions are the unseen polluters (Richardson, 2008) , contributing in obscured ways to environmental troubles which they sponsor and profit from. Having long outgrown its origins of religious-based, ad hoc causes, contemporary SRI is starting to address the financial sector's role in unsustainable development. Yet, SRI actors' motivations for improving the environmental performance of the financial sector increasingly are generally not ethically driven.
Business case SRI -the principal form of SRI -scrutinises social, environmental and corporate governance issues in terms of their effect on the financial performance of investments. These issues acquire significance primarily to the extent that they are perceivable as financially ''material'' to an investment portfolio (UNEPFI, 2004b) . The tools of business case SRI include light-touch investment screens filtering out only the most insidious firms (so as not to significantly diminish portfolio diversification and thus returns), polite engagement with corporate management and more nuanced evaluations of the financial consequences associated with corporations' social and environmental activities. This approach has been endorsed by leading international SRI networks. Catering mainly to the institutional investment sector, the United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI, 2006, p. 4) 
explains in its report, Show Me the Money, that: ''[t]he first -and arguably for investors the most
important -reason to integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to make more money…''. In another UNEPFI report (2004a, p. 5) , financial analysts are advised to demonstrate ''material links to business value; … [and] avoid moral arguments''. In the retail market, such as among mutual funds, SRI is also awash with business case rhetoric, with funds marketed for how they can help investors to reap higher returns and outperform the market (Brill et al., 1999) .
Alternatively, some investors, particularly in the religious sector, see SRI as principally a matter of ethical necessity. From the framework of teleological ethics, they may treat SRI as a means to change the criteria of capital allocation and motivate firms to improve their environmental and social behaviour. This contrasts to the traditional and increasingly rarer deontological type of ethical investment, involving investors who personally do not wish to profit from unethical activities (e.g. gambling or pornography), rather than placing a priority on changing the behaviour of others. Either way, investors are expected to act ethically without being constrained by profit motives. The ethical case, however, does not ignore the bottom line, as investors of any persuasion are not charities. Yet, it diverges from business case justifications for SRI by prioritising ethical issues for their own sake. They may accept lower financial returns in order to defend ethical values.
Ethical investment was pioneered by religious institutions (Triolo et al., 2000, pp. 26-53) . They campaigned for social and environmental concerns not for any financial advantage but for the moral imperative to improve the world. The churches spearheaded a divestment campaign against companies profiting from apartheid in South Africa, contributing to its eventual demise. Some faith-based institutions continue to be the vanguard of change, such as the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility's campaigns concerning climate change and environmental justice.
1 Ethically motivated investors are also found to some extent in the credit union sector, such as Canada's VanCity credit union; in the banking sector, notably the Umweltbank (Germany) and in some mutual funds that offer dedicated (Herz et al., 2007) argues that the poor and marginalised can benefit from the business case approach where financiers find that their projects need community consent and legitimacy. Nonetheless, reputational risk to financiers is not an echo for all underlying societal concerns, as sometimes the most disadvantaged groups and victims of environmental hardship lack the means to publicise their plight. And, some financiers or firms of low public visibility may not be particularly vulnerable to such reputational risks in the first place.
The economy-wide portfolios of large institutional investors provide another potential basis for business case SRI. Hawley and Williams (2000) proclaim ''universal investors'' such as large pension funds as a growing force for corporate responsibility, as their broad stock portfolios should make them interested in the health and long-term sustainability of the entire economy. In contrast, an investor in just one company or one economic sector is not as broadly focused, and presumably therefore will care only about the financial performance of that narrow interest and not necessarily on the costs it may impose on others. It would be optimistic however to imply that such institutional investors can coordinate their investments to keep economic growth within biosphere limits. The market contains no mechanism to scale the economy within the carrying capacity of the planet (Daly, 1992) . In the absence of regulatory restraints, such as a cap on the economy's carbon emissions, universal investors are unlikely to cooperate readily to moderate economic growth imperatives. Further, institutional investors commonly act through intermediaries -fund managers -whose reward system and short-term investment mandates encourage narrow and myopic investment decision making (Golding, 2002 trillion (incorporating further the value of shareholder activism and engagement). The latter, larger figure was the equivalent of between 10% and 15% of managed assets in European funds.
Even these modest numbers strain credibility, as much finance masquerading as SRI likely hardly contributes to sustainable development. The United States study relied on very broad standards for measuring the SRI universe, counting the entire portfolio of funds that screen merely against one issue, such as tobacco, alcohol or gambling. Indeed, 25% of nominal SRI funds screened only on the basis of one of these criteria.
The Eurosif research tallied the value of shareholder engagement and proxy voting practices, yet there is no extensive research on the actual extent and quality of such practices. Because the SRI market is likely to be much smaller than these surveys suggest, its capacity to leverage change by raising the financing costs of polluters or pressuring for change through shareholder activism is probably rather limited (Angel and Rivoli, 1997; Gillan and Starks, 1998) .
SRI legal reforms
The relationship between SRI and the legal system has generally not been adequately scrutinised by policy-makers or commentators (Richardson, 2008) . Certainly, in the broader corporate social responsibility (CSR) debate, there is widespread wrangling over the extent to which corporations can be motivated to act responsibly without the necessity of regulatory compulsion. In a recent contribution to that debate, Reich in his best-seller Supercapitalism (2007) dismisses the possibilities of CSR and calls for the strengthening of democratic processes and public regulation to control corporate excesses. On the other hand, Davis et al. (2006) exude confidence in the capacity of the mass investor society to forge positive change through their pension funds and other investment intermediaries. Indeed, historically, one of the forces behind the growth of SRI has been faith in its ability to provide a form of surrogate market regulation. In the absence of appropriate official regulation, investors hope to leverage change through market pressure. For example, the divestment campaign against South African-based companies was motivated by the failure of governments to act. Yet, as will be argued here, SRI does not stand apart from the legal system. The prevalence of business case SRI not only reflects the pressure of economic fundamentals in a competitive market, it also owes to the legal arrangements governing financial institutions. Conversely, to stimulate ethical investment will likely require the state to alter the incentives and obligations to undertake SRI.
Legal reforms in some countries to promote SRI have generally yet to transform the status quo, which assumes that the market is efficient and functions best with minimal governmental oversight.
Traditionally, authorities have connected ecological and social problems only to those companies that most visibly consume and pollute nature. The SRI reforms to counter that perception have been adopted at both national and international levels, although in the latter they tend to be only voluntary, aspirational standards (Richardson, 2007a) . Congruent with trends in governance worldwide away from ''command-and-control'' regulation, SRI policy reforms have tended to emphasise market-based and informational standards that leave financiers with significant discretion over investment decisions. 10 They contain more credible public reporting and consultation standards, although evidence that some banks continue to sponsor environmentally degrading projects suggests that implementation of the Principles is uneven (Hardenbrook, 2007) .
Governments have introduced some other policy instruments to stimulate SRI, including green investment tax concessions (e.g. in the Netherlands), corporate governance reforms to facilitate shareholder advocacy (e.g. in Australia and Canada) and environmental liability on lenders (e.g. in the United States) (Richardson, 2008, pp. 281-378) . Few developing countries have introduced policy measures to stimulate SRI. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is patchy. In a neo-liberal policy climate where the market is widely seen as the most effective means of promoting social welfare, no jurisdiction has sought to intensify SRI regulation.
In general, the progression of the SRI market, and its governance, remains muted. A vast legal terrain of potential reform remains underexplored. Reliance on existing environmental regulatory controls that target the ''front-line'' businesses, such as mining and manufacturing firms, is insufficient for many reasons. Targeting the financial sector through SRI reforms could reduce the burden on presently often ineffectual front-line regulatory controls, as companies passing the rigours of SRI standards should be easier to regulate at an operational level. Financiers' strategic economic position can also be exploited by policymakers to overcome traditional obstacles to such regulation. Systems theory explains how the differentiation of modern society into semi-autonomous subsystems, such as the market and the legal spheres, has made it difficult for regulation to control corporations whose behaviour is accustomed to the market's norms of money, exchange, competition and profitability (Luhmann, 1995) . The financial sector, while part of the market system, also occupies a strategic position often closely tied to government policy-making (e.g. as a means to implement official monetary policy on interest rates or money laundering controls). Financial institutions could also be harnessed as a means of environmental regulation, such as through requirements to promote SRI (Richardson, 2002) . Above all, in a global economy shaped increasingly by cross-border investment, regulatory controls at the point of where capital is raised are crucial. Global finance, which enables financiers to invest in foreign markets with weak human rights and environmental standards, must be countered by sustainability standards embedded into financial markets.
Ethics for investing for sustainability
In a milieu where SRI is largely a matter of voluntary choice rather than regulatory compulsion, a diversity of approaches to SRI has flourished. This diversity reflects investors' different values regarding the relative importance of social, environmental and economic considerations (Mackenzie, 1998; Sparkes, 2001 ).
Hylton ( Alternatively, investors can hardly set their moral compass only by the law of the land. Merely because an economic activity is ostensibly ''legal'' does not mean it is appropriate for ethical investment. The tobacco industry is a clear example. Legal rules may simply reflect the power of vested interests or fail to meet basic international human rights and environmental standards. Given that one of the traditional purposes of SRI has been to advance change, to push corporations beyond current legal standards, it would seem counterproductive to fall back on the latter as the benchmark to follow.
Unavoidably, SRI needs a stronger ethical foundation to contribute more thoroughly to sustainability.
Ownership, competition and material gain are characteristics of the financial world which reduce nature to an expedient resource for shortterm gain. They reflect a wider anthropocentric worldview in most cultures that restrict moral significance to human beings (White, 1967) . In a statement on unsustainable patterns of resource use, the UN Economic and Social Council (2002, p. 5) explained:
''[t]he value systems reflected in these patterns are among the main driving forces which determine the use of natural resources. Although the changes required for converting societies to sustainable consumption and production patterns are not easy to implement, the shift is imperative''.
Underpinning SRI with an ethic that takes into account the importance of safeguarding ecological integrity would provide the platform for SRI to contribute to sustainability policy goals more comprehensively.
Beyond the financial sector, a vibrant discourse on ecological ethics has matured. It focuses on broadening moral consideration for all animals and plants and their constituent ecosystems (Light and Rolston, 2003; Schmidtz and Willott, 2002; Stone, 1987; Taylor, 1998) . It is shaped by recognition of humankind's dependence on nature's life sustaining properties (Capra, 1996) . However, rejecting the anthropocentric traditions of environmental resource management, this approach also affirms the sanctity of all species for their ''intrinsic value'', regardless of any perceived instrumental worth to human welfare. While this outlook does not deny human beings' entitlement to use other forms of life, given that we are ''participants in the evolutionary process'' (Engel, 2005, p. 62) , it provides humankind with a framework to think beyond its own interests. The environmental practices of indigenous communities to some extent reflect such values (Durning, 1992 Declaration also seeks to strengthen financiers' accountability and transparency, expecting them to be ''responsive to stakeholder needs for specialised information'' and that ''commercial confidentiality should not be used as an excuse to deny stakeholders information''.
The financial sector's disavowal of such exacting principles suggests that an ethical framework must be based on more than a voluntary code, although its standards should certainly be formulated with input from applicable institutions. Ethical investment will have no lasting impression on the financial sector if investors regard it simply as regulatory prescription. Rather than relaying on regulatory commands based on a rigid laundry list of allowable investments, ethical standards could be incorporated into financial decision making by redefining the fiduciary duties of investment institutions. Indeed, as fiduciary duties set the overarching investment norms, they should be central to legal reforms for SRI.
Legal reforms for ethical investment

Fiduciary duties
Financial relationship is a bond of responsibility and dependency, where one person exercises some discretionary power in the interests of another (Shepherd, 1981) . This relationship of ''trust'' is a concept of English law by which specific assets are held and managed by the trustee (i.e. the fiduciary) in the interests of the beneficiary (Hudson, 1999) . Functionally, similar legal arrangements in financial regulation tend to exist in civil law jurisdictions. The relationship of trust involves a duty of loyalty, requiring the fiduciary to act in the beneficiaries' sole or best interests (Langbein, 2005) . The fiduciary also has a duty of competence, requiring skill and diligence, which is usually expressed in investment management as the ''prudent investor rule'' (Longstreth, 1986) . Depending on the jurisdiction, the sources of their legal duties come from the common law, legislation and the specific instruments governing an investment entity (e.g. a pension plan's founding agreement). Fiduciary responsibilities however are not uniform across the financial sector. Occupational pension fund trustees are subject to clear fiduciary duties, while the directors of commercial banks do not generally owe an equivalent duty to their depositors.
Fiduciary standards were first seen as a potential constraint to SRI in the 1980s, during the South African divestment campaign (Troyer et al., 1985) . Today, the impact of fiduciary duties on a much Fiduciary standards can constrain SRI to the extent they prioritise unadulterated financial goals.
Conceptually, a ''benefit'' to beneficiaries need not be limited to financial values. If they share a moral objection to a particular investment, they may psychologically benefit if their fund avoids it, possibly even to their financial detriment (Palmer et al., 2005, p. 97 (Edwards, 1998; Mercer, 2005) .
The question of whether current fiduciary standards can accommodate SRI also depends on several other variables, including the methods of SRI. Strict ethical screens that exclude large portions of the market reduce portfolio diversification and thereby likely diminish risk-adjusted returns (Ellison, 1991 the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), by focusing on community and environmental impacts rather than on factors exclusively related to corporate financial health. Nonetheless, years of research on social accounting has hardly influenced conventional financial accounting (Gray et al., 1996) .
The GAAP measures an entity's expenses and income associated with past, not future, market transactions. Accounting for the disparate and often ethereal externalities of firms in a financier's portfolio would require fundamental changes to this model. So far, social accounting has mostly influenced the propagation of satellite, narrative reporting schemes, such as the ''management discussion and analysis'' sections in corporate financial statements.
While social accounting is not a means of perpetuating business case SRI -for it focuses on pricing social welfare rather than serving corporate business needs -it may not induce better quality SRI.
It implies a cost-benefit paradigm that may not ensure maintenance of ecological integrity, as nature may be trumped or substituted by seemingly more pressing values. The Ford Pinto case in the 1970s, where corporate managers used a cost-benefit analysis to conclude that the costs of correcting a defective fuel system design on one of the company's cars outweighed the expected litigation costs of deaths and/or injuries, highlights the dangers of instrumental economic calculations (Birsch and Fielder, 1994) . Similar social accounting goals could perhaps be achieved through economic policy instruments such as environmental taxes charged to polluting companies (which in turn would create costs to be accounted for in investment decisions). The usefulness of such economic policy instruments depends on the integrity of the environmental policy goals that they are meant to serve. Social accounting is therefore probably most suitable as one means to help price the cost of social and environmental behaviour and facilitate cost-effective solutions, but it itself does not embody sustainability performance standards.
More useful in this respect are sustainability indicators. They allow progress towards sustainability based on certain social, environmental and other markers to be tracked over time (Bell and Morse, 2008) .
They can also assist decision makers by translating ecological, economic and social data into performance standards, and warning of impending problems. While sustainability indicators can be just as methodologically complex to determine as social accounting metrics, they do not per se require financial quantification. And, they do not dictate how underlying performance standards be met. With further refinement, they even could replace shareholder value as the dominant measure of corporate success.
Sustainability indicators differ from traditional indicators of social, economic and environmental progresses that measure changes in one domain (e.g. water quality) by seeking to reflect interconnections among such metrics enabling a more systemic, comprehensive and multidisciplinary perspective. Some useful proxy indicators of sustainability have been pioneered, the ''eco-footprint'' concept being the most promising (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996) . New sustainability metrics are being designed for various scales of economic activity, ranging from the global level down to the local community, company and project levels (Keeble et al., 2003) . Concomitantly, we should be mindful that sustainability indicators and social accounting systems will not reflect all social and environmental aspects of investment. Some issues are too complex for these methods, at least presently. One example is the evaluation of the social equity in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of use of the environment. While investment fiduciaries may be able to effectively respond to discrete social problems, such as divesting from firms that exploit child labour or practice racially discriminatory hiring, fiduciaries can hardly address pervasive social and economic inequalities inherent in a capitalist economy.
Together, sustainability indicators and social accounting provide tools for fiduciary duties to further ethical investment for some aspects of sustainability. The equally significant challenge is how those duties should be legally framed.
Fiduciary duties for SRI
Fiduciary duties for ethical investment may be redefined along a spectrum of ever-increasing exactitude (Richardson, 2007b) . At the most liberal end of the spectrum, fiduciary duties could merely authorise fiduciaries to consider those social and environmental factors which they view as financially material.
Arguably, this business case approach is already allowable, indeed essential if environmental risks jeopardise shortterm returns. Such a reform to fiduciary duties would put the matter beyond doubt. Some jurisdictions already have altered fiduciary standards to give decision-makers more discretion. Connecticut legislation provides that controllers of the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds may consider the environmental and social implications of investments. 23 Two Canadian provinces, Manitoba and Ontario, provide further examples. In 1995, Manitoba's Trustee Act was amended to permit trustees to consider nonfinancial criteria in their investment policies, so long as ''the trustee exercises the judgment and care that a person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would exercise in administering the property of others''.
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In 2005, a similar provision was grafted into Manitoban pension legislation.
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Obviously, the weakness of such a discretionary standard is that it does not oblige consideration of social or environmental impacts. Nor does it allow affected third parties to enforce their interests. There is a difference between taking the interests of various parties into account and owing a duty to those parties. The duty of loyalty that a fiduciary owes under this model would remain to the fund's beneficiaries. 26 In the absence of other legislative means of recourse, this would make any legal recognition of the social and environmental consequences of investment functionally unenforceable. The main advantage of a discretionary approach is that it would enable fiduciaries to take pre-emptive measures to improve the environmental performance of their investments rather than merely react to known costs or tangible risks.
Alternatively, legislation could enshrine procedures to improve the likelihood that fiduciaries would consider the social and environmental impacts of their portfolios. Consideration of such impacts could still be discretionary, but procedural reforms should make it more likely that fiduciaries would act responsibly. Preferably, financiers should be obliged not only to disclose their SRI policies -as required in some jurisdictions -but also their investment methodology and implementation efforts. Financiers' disclosures on SRI could also be audited independently, and deficiencies publicly exposed. More invasively, regulation could authorise outside stakeholders to have a voice in financial institutions' governance, as representatives of particular social and environmental interests or constituencies, or at least to require fiduciaries to consult with third parties. Already, the Equator Principles require signatory banks to consult with local communities who may be affected by projects that they plan to finance.
One rationale for these reforms is that the governing boards of pension trusts, investment funds and banks are typically drawn from a narrow segment of society. They commonly lack expertise on SRI issues and do not adequately understand modern social and environmental challenges (Gribben and Gitsham, 2006) . Reshaping fiduciary duties by these ways is controversial (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) . The potential multitude of interests that a fiduciary would need to consider could unduly complicate decision making (Jensen, 2000) . Where a fiduciary must consider numerous conflicting interests without any way of prioritising among them, any decision taken that is not blatantly self-interested possibly becomes defensible. One solution would be to accommodate a voice for stakeholders in an external entity, such as a national ethics council responsible. The state could appoint a body of representatives from key constituencies to devise standards for ethical investment for sustainable development. Fiduciaries would receive guidance on difficult ethical questions, avoiding trial and error. Sweden and Norway have already established ethics councils to guide their public pension funds.
Further along the spectrum of possible reforms, fiduciaries could be obliged to act for sustainable development or a similar general performance standard. The difficulty would be to design a performance standard with sufficient clarity to make fiduciaries accountable. A vague duty ''to promote sustainability'' would alone probably not work. Like the societal debates about sustainable development, such a general goal would be subject to discretionary interpretations that would allow problematic tradeoffs and perfunctory implementation. It would therefore need to be embellished with prophylactic rules.
Certainly, investing in an ostensibly lawful activity would not necessarily suffice. Commonly, no simple distinction between a permissible and prohibited economic activity exists; typically, most corporate activities or products are controlled, subject to impact assessments, permits and other regulatory checks. And in some countries with rudimentary systems of environmental law, even an expressly permissible activity may run afoul of elementary international sustainability standards. For example, sustainability indicators could be prescribed by regulation to effectively set fiduciary performance benchmarks, such as for the carbon footprint of a portfolio or other broad indicators enabling a fuller view of environmental performance. By this approach, fiduciaries would not be required to estimate and account for the social and environmental costs and benefits of investments.
Rather, they would need to ensure that their total investment portfolio adheres to prescribed sustainability benchmarks by whatever means they choose. Its advantages are setting clear benchmarks for financiers while avoiding prescribed methods for arriving at set results. Financial institutions that fail to meet such standards could be subject to regulatory sanctions including future restrictions on their investment choices or financial penalties to reflect social costs.
Thus, the fiduciary standard by this model would effectively emphasise the ''returns'' to society as a whole. While the language of ''returns'' may sound too instrumental for ecological ethicists, it simply is one way of articulating in the vocabulary of financial analysts the goals of maintaining and enhancing ecological integrity. But, crucially, while investors could continue to be legally defined as the sole beneficiaries of such fiduciary duties, diminishing sustainability would no longer be a permissible means of obtaining financial gain. While some values and practices, particularly in areas such as human rights, may defy simplification into sustainability indicators, supplementary means such as duties to conduct social impact assessments and consult with affected stakeholders might assist. The next section canvasses some options for additional reforms to promote ethical investment for sustainability.
Secondary reforms
To keep ethical investment ethical will require more from law-makers than redefined fiduciary obligations.
For example, in the retail investment market, mutual funds have much more flexibility in their investment choices and conceivably can cater to any value that investors demand including those oppressive to environmental considerations. In the banking sector, in most jurisdictions lenders do not owe depositors a fiduciary duty, and banks have sometimes been implicated in financing environmentally controversial projects (BankTrack, 2004) . Therefore, other kinds of policy tools must be harnessed to capture the diverse array of financial entities and transactions.
As a priority, reformers must seek to improve the quality of corporate environmental and social reporting. Having companies report regularly and comprehensively on their environmental and social activities and impacts can help greatly to generate reliable information to inform SRI choices (Harte et al., 1991 Corporate governance must also be reformed. The importance of democratising governance within financial institutions has already been canvassed. Comparable reforms at the corporate level are necessary given that social investors sometimes rely on shareholder advocacy as a means of changing recalcitrant firms from within. Shareholder resolutions sponsored by institutional investors are a seminal means by which financiers can seek to influence company policy (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999) . In some jurisdictions, significant barriers to shareholder activism persist, such as restrictions on the type of issues that can be raised in a shareholder resolution and the passive culture of voting fostered by proxy contest rules (Sarra, 2003) . Among possible reforms beyond liberalising the use of shareholder resolutions, investment institutions could be required to register their share votes, so as to encourage them to formulate and express a view on all issues put to a vote at shareholder meetings. Another possibility is the appointment of more minority-independent directors to corporate boards, nominated by various stakeholder constituencies rather than by the firm's management (Gilson and Kraakman, 1991, p. 870) .
Economic instruments, such as pollution taxes and tradeable emission allowances, provide another area for reform. They can attribute quantified negative and positive externalities to firms, for reflection in their earnings, competitiveness and, ultimately, share prices and other financial indicators. This attribution, in turn, should influence the allocation of capital, making polluters competitively disadvantaged. While SRI regulation cannot rest only on a system of monetary incentives if it wishes to move beyond the business case, it is one of the most politically viable reforms. Already, the Netherlands' tax incentives for green project investments have catalysed the Dutch SRI market, accounting for about half of its SRI (Scholtens, 2005) . Taxes can also reward long-term investment, such as by levying charges on short-term gains from trading shares. While such measures can help strengthen the business case for SRI, they can also help reduce resistance to ethical investment by negating the countervailing economic incentives.
Another kind of economic instrument is created by liability rules, under which a company or even its financial sponsor is responsible for the costs of pollution or other environmental damage. This can illuminate the environmental impacts of investment more acutely to financial investors. Liability of financiers could arise where an institutional shareholder was in a position to exert significant influence or where a lender disregarded due diligence requirements for assessing a borrower's environmental safeguards. Such costs would ultimately affect the cost of finance. In the United States, lender liability under the 1980 ''Superfund'' legislation for cleanup of contaminated lands had some sobering effects on the behaviour of banks (Norton, 1995) . However, financier liability has several drawbacks that limit its contribution to SRI. Unlike environmental taxes, the liability model depends upon a well-resourced plaintiff willing to challenge a polluter in court. Further, the complex evidential rules under which such law suits must be proved, greatly hinder the chances of successful litigation. More fundamentally, tying the liability of a bank or investment fund to the environmental harms of the firms that it finances ignores the argument that sometimes financiers should be held to a higher standard of behaviour given both their strategic environmental significance and the wider economic repercussions if they fail.
States must also get their own house in order. Public finance, such as public sector pension funds, can be ''a potentially powerful catalyst for change'' towards sustainable development (Hess, 2007, p. 42) . States could mobilise public capital to address strategic social and environmental issues, as occurs to some extent in the national pension plans of Scandinavia and France that are obliged to invest ethically and responsibly.
Through their central banks, states could also influence capital allocation by giving preferential treatment to environmentally critical industries. In an international context, foreign aid and multilateral development investments provide further contexts for SRI (Handl, 2001; Tarp, 2000) . Public-private financing partnerships, availed sometimes in multilateral finance, offer a novel way by which governments can guide financial markets (French, 1998) . Environmental-conditioned partnerships on preferential terms could bridge the cost gap between what private financiers wish to commit and what is necessary for environmentally sustainable investments.
Finally, among possible collateral reforms for SRI that are less tied to economic incentives and self-interest, an international treaty setting social and environmental standards for global finance would be beneficial. SRI governance can no longer hinge solely on national standards (Doering et al., 2002, p. 54) . International level financial regulation would mitigate a deleterious race to the bottom, as common standards should reduce the incentives for financiers to flee to the most regulatorily benign markets. The existing panoply of voluntary international standards, such as the UNPRI or Equator Principles, lacks the exacting standards required. An international treaty could prescribe a general fiduciary duty for sustainability, clear sustainability performance standards and more robust procedural standards on public disclosure and consultation. Certainly, this is not an easy path, for the fate of the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations proposed in 2002 illustrates the obstacles that vested
interests would create to such a comprehensive challenge to the freedoms of global finance.
Conclusions
So far, SRI has had an evolutionary rather than revolutionary impact on financial markets. In its traditional guise, SRI provides both a warning and an opportunity to the financial sector. It warns that investment practices often impair ecological health and intensify social injustice. It also presents an opportunity to reform those practices and thereby enable financiers to contribute to sustainability policy goals. While the SRI market is flourishing, underlying practices remain largely unchanged; investors may acknowledge environmental problems where they are financially material to the bottom line, but they discreetly eschew deeper ethical issues. The business case model of SRI sanguinely transforms the tensions between environmental protection and profitable investment into a harmonious relationship. Of course, that environmental care and business success can be compatible is not deniable -financiers should benefit from companies that reduce their ecological footprint.
The objection arises in how some financiers masquerading as responsible investors merely tinker with unsustainable practices. Tethered to a philosophy of financial materiality, the business case may address some environmental problems through improved research and analysis. However, it cannot accommodate ecological issues not valued by the market, and existing strategies in this model are unlikely to transform investment ''value'' to incorporate other non-financial factors. Without demonstrated financial advantage, an investment analysis may advocate delaying or halting measures that mitigate pollution, especially in the absence of effective government regulation and stakeholder pressure. In fact, a countervailing business case for intensifying environmentally unsustainably practices will be evaluated. Thus, despite the SRI industry's rhetoric about climate change risks, the fossil fuel industry has hardly changed as surging investment in Alberta's oil sands lamentably shows (Makin, 2007) . To keep ethical investment ethical necessitates many changes to SRI regulation. The legal system is the midwife of society, translating its values and expectations into workable policy instruments for implementation.
Among the menu of reforms, the reformulation of fiduciary duties is crucial. They define the core goals and processes of decision making within financial institutions. Through fiduciary duties, the traditional concept of ''benefit'' to investors can be ethically redefined, and thereby financiers steered towards sustainability. If grounded in new forms of social accounting, sustainability indicators and performance standards, such fiduciary standards could bring financiers much nearer to a system of ethical investment that respects the environment. Legal reforms to improve the business case for SRI can help, but harnessing economic self-interest must be a means to an end, not the end itself. To properly address the causes of humankind's unsustainable path, the financial sector like other economic sectors must function within a broader ethical envelope that prioritises other values.
